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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH and
GRETTA JOYCE HEIDLEBAUGH,
Husband and Wife,

:

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

:

(Plaintiffs) Appellants,

:

-v-

:

LEROf WEBB, PAUL NELSON and
CLINTON CITY,

:

Case No. 88-0400

(Defendants) Respondents.
ooOoo
JURISDICTION
1.

Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court

confers jurisdiction on this Court to hear this appeal.
2.

This appeal is from a final order of the Second

Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby presiding, dismissing
the Heidlebaughs1 action for civil rights violations on the
basis of that court's determination that the dismissal of the
first action was res judicata, on the merits, and with prejudice.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the district court committed reversible

error in dismissing the instant action (hereinafter sometimes
referred to as "the second action");
2.

Whether the district court committed reversible

error in determining that Appellants had not, in a prior,

virtually identical, action (hereinafter sometimes referred to
as "the first action"), voluntarily agreed to dismiss their
Complaint in that action;
3.

Whether the district court committed reversible

error in failing to determine that Rule 41(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure was controlling; and
4.

Whether the district court committed reversible

error in determining that the dismissal of the first action
was pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was res judicata, and operated as an adjudication upon
the merits.
PERTINENT RULE AND STATUTE
The pertinent provisions of Rule 41(a) and (b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are the following:
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulationSubject
to the provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66,
and of any applicable statute, an action may
be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of
court ... (ii) by filing a stipulation of
dismissal signed by all parties who have
appeared in the action. Unless otherwise
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice ...
(2) By order of court. Except as provided
in Paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this
rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the
plaintiff's instance save upon order of the
court and upon such terms and conditions as
the court deems proper.... Unless otherwise
specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph is without prejudice.
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(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof.
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or
to comply with these rules or any order of
court, a defendant may move for dismissal of
an action or of any claim against him...•
Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for
in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for
lack of an indispensable party, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.
The only statute relevant to this appeal, Utah Code Ann.
§78-12-40, provides:
If any action is commenced within due time
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such
action or upon a cause of action otherwise
than upon the merits, and the time limited
either by law or contract for commencing the
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if
he dies and the cause of action survives, his
representatives, may commence a new action
within one year after the reversal or failure.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Mr. and Mrs. Heidlebaugh request that this Court reverse
the district court's dismissal of the second action and rejnand
this case to that court, with instructions to allow the underlying dispute to go forward and be determined on its merits.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. and Mrs. Heidlebaugh appeal from the final order of
the district court, which order dismissed, with prejudice, the
second action.
In 1985, the Heidlebaughs brought the first action
against the Respondents, alleging civil rights violations.
Respondents noticed the deposition of Mr. Heidlebaugh.
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He did

not appear.

In lieu of proceeding to hearing on Respondents1

motion to compel the deposition or, in the alternative, to
dismiss the action, counsel for the parties reached a stipulation to the effect that the Heidlebaughs would appear for
depositions on a date certain (January 5, 1987), and that, if
they did not appear, the action would be dismissed.

The

Heidlebaughs did not appear for their depositions, and the
district court entered its order of dismissal, to which Appellants1 counsel in that action (not their present counsel) had
theretofore indicated his approval, and which did not expressly state whether the dismissal was "with prejudice" or "without prejudice."
Pursuant to the saving statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40,
Appellants filed a new Complaint (the second action) against
Respondents, asserting virtually identical claims.

The dis-

trict court concluded, in the second action, that the dismissal of the first action operated as an adjudication upon
the merits of the dispute and that, therefore, the Heidlebaughs were barred from bringing the second action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. and Mrs. Heidlebaugh respectfully submit that the
following is a statement of undisputed facts material to the
disposition of this appeal:
1.

On November 22, 1985, the same Plaintiffs herein

sued the same Defendants herein on allegations of civil rights
violations substantially identical to those which are set
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forth in the Complaint in the second action.

(R. at 2-3, 7,

68, 71).
2.

In that first action, the Defendants (Respondents

herein) filed, on or about June 17, 1986, a notice of the
deposition of Robert Heidlebaugh on August 18, 1986.

(R. at

22, 68 and 71).
3.

That deposition was subsequently continued by stipu-

lation of counsel to September 9, 1986.
4.
tion.

(Id.).

Robert Heidlebaugh did not appear for his deposi(Id.) .

5.

On November 4, 1986, Respondents moved the district

court to compel the Heidlebaughs to appear for their depositions or, in the alternative, to dismiss the action.

(R. at

13, 21-23, 68 and 71).
6.

On December 16, 1986, counsel for the parties

reached a stipulation, which required the Heidlebaughs to
appear for their depositions on January 5, 1987, or their Complaint would be dismissed.
7.

The Heidlebaughs did not appear for their deposi-

tions on January 5, 1987.X

1.

(R. at 13, 27-29, 68, 71).

(R. at 14, 32-33, 68, 71).

There is a dispute, not relevant to this action, between
the Heidlebaughs and their prior counsel, on whether the
Heidlebaughs were in fact notified of any of the deposition dates. The district court made no finding with
respect to that question. (R. at 71-72).
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8.

On February 10, 1987, the district court entered its

Order of Dismissal, to which the Heidlebaughsf counsel in that
action had signed his approval, and which did not expressly
state whether the dismissal was "with prejudice" or "without
prejudice."
9.

(R. at 14, 32-33, 68-69, 71).

No previous order had been entered by the district

court, in that first action, compelling either Mr. Heidlebaugh
or Mrs. Heidlebaugh to appear for deposition.

(R. at 27-29,

32) .
10.

In the second action, the district court concluded

that the dismissal of the first action was entered because
Robert Heidlebaugh did not make himself available for a deposition in the first action and that, therefore, the dismissal
of the Complaint in that action had been for cause.

(R. at

68-72).
11.

The district court concluded, in the second action,

that the dismissal of the first action operated as an adjudication upon the merits of the dispute under Utah R. Civ. P.
4 K b ) and that, therefore, the Heidlebaughs could not rely on
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40, the saving statute, to file a second
action, even though the second action was filed in timely
fashion pursuant to that statute (on February 10, 1988).
(Id.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Heidlebaughs' pursuit of this appeal is based on
their contention that the district court clearly erred in
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determining that the dismissal of the original action was an
involuntary dismissal and an adjudication on the merits pursuant to Rule 41(b), Utah R. Civ* P.

As a matter of law, the

stipulation entered into between the Heidlebaughs' prior counsel and the Defendants1 counsel operated as a stipulation for
dismissal conditioned upon the Heidlebaughs1 not attending
their depositions at the specified time.

When the Heidle-

baughs did not appear for their depositions, Respondents'
counsel submitted, with the stipulation, an Order, approved as
to form by the Heidlebaughs1 prior counsel, dismissing the
action.

The district court entered the Order.

Because the Order of Dismissal did not state that it was
"with prejudice," the dismissal was, under Rule 41(a), without
prejudice.

The Heidlebaughs were thus entitled to bring a new

action under Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40.

They did so, in a

timely fashion, on February 10, 1988, and they should be
allowed to have their case heard on the merits.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS AGREED TO DISMISS THEIR COMPLAINT
BY STIPULATION, AND THAT CONSTITUTES A VOLUNTARY
DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE UNDER RULE 41(a)
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
As stated hereinabove, the Heidlebaughs1 prior counsel
agreed by stipulation to dismiss their action if they failed
to appear for their depositions scheduled for January 5, 1987.
By the terms of the stipulation, the Heidlebaughs agreed that
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"if the plaintiffs fail to appear at that time and place, that
the plaintiffs agree that the court will dismiss their complaint filed herein."

(R. at 27). The deposition did not go

forward on the stated date, and the court subsequently entered
an Order submitted by Defendants' counsel and approved as to
form by the Heidlebaughsf prior counsel.

That Order stated as

follows:
Based upon the previously submitted stipulation of counsel that the plaintiffs would
appear for their depositions at 10:00 a.m. on
January 5, 1987, the defendants' counsel of
record having submitted a notice of said
depositions, and it being represented to the
court that the plaintiffs did not appear at
the above stated time and place, that based
upon the foregoing stipulation that this
matter would be dismissed,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiffs' complaint is hereby dismissed.
(R. at 32-33) (emphasis added).
Rule 41(a)(1)(ii), Utah R. Civ. P., provides that an
action may be voluntarily dismissed "by the plaintiff without
order of the court ... by filing a stipulation of dismissal
signed by all parties who have appeared in the action.

Unless

otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation,
the dismissal is without prejudice...."

Because neither the

stipulation nor the subsequent order of the court, entered
pursuant to the stipulation, indicates whether the dismissal
was with or without prejudice, under Rule 41(a), the dismissal
was without prejudice.
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Since this rule was fashioned after Rule 41, Fed. R. Civ*
P., "we look freely to federal cases decided under this rule
in determining its scope and meaning."

Madsen v. Borthwick,

97 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 18 n. 4 (Dec. 12, 1988)
Numerous federal decisions have held that if a court
order is entered upon the stipulation of the parties, unless
the stipulation specifies otherwise, the dismissal is without
prejudice.

E.g., McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home,

843 F.2d 930, 934-935 (11th Cir. 1987); Poloron Products, Inc.
v. Lybrand Ross Bros. & Montgomery, 534 F.2d 1012, 1017 (2nd
Cir. 1976) (court held voluntary-dismissal stipulation in
first case was without prejudice and that defendants could
have included the words "with prejudice" if they so intended).
Entry of a stipulation for dismissal is automatically effective and does not require court approval.

First Natyl Bank of

Toms River, N.J, v. Marina City, Inc., 411 F.2d 674, 677 (3rd
Cir. 1969).
A stipulation for dismissal, although not formally written or signed, still constitutes a voluntary dismissal.

Pipe-

liners Local Union No. 798, Tulsa, Okl. v. Ellerd, 503 F.2d
1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 1974) (court held stipulation in open
court by counsel for parties for dismissal of action upon
which court entered an order of dismissal constituted a voluntary dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 41(a)); Oswalt v.
Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1980) (court held
an oral dismissal of claims during the course of the trial was
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sufficient to constitute a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) even
though there was no formal dismissal or stipulation filed with
the clerk).

In Oswalt, the court further stated "to require

the filing of a formal document would be to countenance a
mechanistic view of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
exalt form over substance."

Idl. at 195.

These cases have

held, in essence, that when a stipulation for dismissal is
filed, the court's entry of an order effectuating the stipulation for dismissal does not convert a Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal
to a Rule 41(a)(2) or Rule 4 K b ) dismissal.

If this Court

should determine, contrary to the foregoing analysis, that
Rule 41(a)(1) does not apply, either because the stipulation
was not signed, or because an order was in fact entered thereon, then Rule 41(a)(2) would apply.

That Rule provides, in

pertinent part:
Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not
be dismissed at the plaintiffs1 instance, save
upon order of the court and upon such terms
and conditions as the court deems proper ...
unless otherwise specified in the order, a
dismissal under this paragraph is without
prejudice.
In the first action, the order of dismissal was made pursuant to the parties1 stipulation, and should therefore be
determined to have been, for purposes pertinent to this
appeal, at the Heidlebaughsf "instance."

And, because the

Order did not specify whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice, the dismissal was, by the clear language of the
Rule, without prejudice.
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Finally, although an attorney is empowered to stipulate
to dismissal without prejudice, he or she has no such implied
authority to dismiss an action with prejudice.

Engelhardt v.

Bell & Howell Co,, 299 F.2d 480, 483-484 (8th Cir. 1962).
Without the consent of the Heidlebaughs, their prior counsel
did not have the authority and was not empowered to stipulate
to a dismissal with prejudice, but only to one without prejudice.

There is nothing in the record to indicate that such

authority had been given, and this Court may take judicial
notice of the fact that the Heidlebaughs have filed a lawsuit
against their former counsel alleging negligence in his handling of their claims against Respondents, and that they have,
in that lawsuit, alleged, among other things, that the stipulation for dismissal of the first action was improper.

Civil

No. CV 3295-88; Second District Court of Weber County, State
of Utah.
POINT II
THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL WAS NOT MADE
PURSUANT TO RULE 4 K b ) OF THE
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, NOR
WAS IT MADE UPON THE MERITS
Rule 41(b) provides that a defendant may move for dismissal of an action for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute
or to comply with any rule or order of the court.

That rule

further provides:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for
in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for
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lack of an indispensable party, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.
In the first action, there was no finding that the
Heidlebaughs failed to prosecute or to comply with any court
order or rule.

The court did not order them to appear at

depositions, nor did the court order that if they did not
appear for their depositions, the matter would be dismissed.
The court did not find, in its Order of Dismissal or elsewhere, that the Heidlebaughs violated any court rule or order.
Finally, the Heidlebaughs did not have the opportunity to respond in any hearing with respect to the supposed involuntary
dismissal.

The court was never even asked to rule on anything

in dispute.
Nor was the first dismissal on the merits under the
"catchall" provision of the last sentence of Rule 41(b), which
states that "any dismissal not provided for in this rule" is
"an adjudication on the merits."

In Madsen, this Court held

that a non-specific dismissal for "failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted," while not expressly
entered pursuant to Rule 4 K b ) , was governed by the catchall
last sentence of Rule 4 K b ) . 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 15.

This

Court held that the failure to give statutory notice came
within the "lack of jurisdiction" exception and that, therefore, the second action should not have been dismissed.

Id.

Although the non-disputed first dismissal in the case at
hand does not fall within one of the three Rule 4 K b ) exceptions mentioned in Madsen, that fact is insignificant when it
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is understood that that dismissal was voluntary in nature, was
governed by Rule 41(a), and was, in the rubric of the last
sentence of Rule 4 K b ) , a "dismissal pro\ ided for in this
rule...."

See, e.g., Quealy v. Sullivan, 42 Utah 565, 132

Pac. 4 (1913).
The dismissal of the first action wes not a dismissal
based upon the merits.

By specifying in its order that the

dismissal was made pursuant to the parties1 stipulation and by
reason of the Heidlebaughs' failure to appear for the depositions, "the court," in Rule 4 K b ) languaoe, "in its order for
dismissal or otherwise" specified that the dismissal was not
an "adjudication upon the merits."

See, Lohman v. General Am.

Life Ins. Co., 478 F.2d 719, 722 (8th Cir. 1973).

There the

court held the trial court's "order for dismissal did 'otherwise specify' [under Rule 41(b)] by finding the plaintiff had
failed t> comply with the court's order to compel plaintiff to
answer interrogatories."

Id.

at 722.

Furthermore, the general policy is to adjudicate cases on
their merits.

Poloron Prod. Inc., 534 F.2d at 1017 (quoting

the U. S. Supreme Court:

"The basic purpose of the Federal

Rules is to administer justice through fcir trials, not
through summary dismissals...."

Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels

Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373, 86 S.Ct. 845, £51, 15 L.Ed.2d 807,
814 (1966)).
The Utah Supreme Court noted this general policy, stating:
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Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b) is a
harsh and permanent remedy when it precludes
presentation of a plaintiff's claim on the
merits. Our rules of procedure are intended
to encourage the adjudication of disputes on
their merits.
Bonneville Tower Condo. Mgmt. Comm. v. Thompson-Michie
Assoc., Inc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1988) (the Court held
that since the trial court did not consider the merits of
plaintiff's clcLm, there was no reason for the Court to dismiss with preji3ice and prevent future consideration of claims
for failure to join an indispensable party.)
There is e distinct trend in federal courts against
granting dismissals with prejudice based upon violation of
court rules or orders.
in extreme cases.

Such remedies should be granted only

Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse,

271 F.2d 910, S14 (2nd Cir. 1959).

And, where a dismissal

comes about by reason of the attorney's fault, as may be the
case here, drastic penalties or sanctions such as dismissal
without prejudice should not be imposed upon the client.

See,

e.g., Flaska v. Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885,
888-889 (5th Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 392 U.S. 928.
Because Appellants' prior action was dismissed without
prejudice and cid not act as a judgment on the merits, Plaintiffs' Complairt in the second action was filed in timely
fashion under t tah Code Ann. §78-12-40 and should not have
been dismissed.

Madsen, 97 Utah Adv. Rpt. at 18 (plaintiffs

were not time-tarred since second action was filed within one
year after the court dismissed first action).
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Quealy, 132

Pac. 4; Williams v. Nelson, 45 Utah 255, 145 P.2d 39 (1914)
(this Court held that where a non-suit is granted, the action
does not fail upon the merits, and the reason for which the
non-suit was granted is immaterial).

In Quealy, this Court

stated that a judgment is not on the merits within the meaning
of Rule 41(b) when the case is dismissed on plaintiff's
motion; therefore, an action brought within one year after
such a dismissal was not barred by the statute of limitations,
132 Pac. 4.

Because Plaintiffs1 second Complaint was filed on

February 10, 1988, exactly one year after the prior action was
dismissed, Plaintiffs1 second cause of action was timely and
should not have been dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The first action was voluntarily dismissed pursuant to
Rule 41(a).

Because the Order of Dismissal was pursuant to a

stipulation by the parties and was silent on the issue of
whether the action was dismissed with or without prejudice,
the~ action was dismissed without prejudice, by reason of the
clear language of Rule 41(a).

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40

allows a plaintiff to commence a new action within one year
after failure upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the
merits.

Because the Heidlebaughs commenced the second action

within one year of the voluntary dismissal of the first
action, the district court's Order of Dismissal of the second
action was in error and should be reversed.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of January, 1989.
WINDER \

HASLAM

Peter C. Collins
Tamara K. Prince
Attorneys for Appellants

Peter C. Collins
Tamara K. Prince
Attorneys for Appellants
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this 27th day of January, 1989, I
caused four copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be
mailed to Robert G. Gilchrist, Esq., RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON, Key Bank Tower, Suite 100, 50 South Main Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110.
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GARY D. STOTT
ROBERT G. GILCHRIST
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
Attorneys for Defendants
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH and GRETTA
JOYCE HEIDLEBAUGH, husband

STIPULATION AND ORDER

and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
LEROY WEBB, PAUL NELSON and
CLINTON CITY,

Civil No.:

38432

Defendants.

The plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of
record, John Caine and defendants, by and through their
counsel of record Robert G. Gilchrist, hereby stipulate and
agree that based upon the plaintiffs• attorney representation
that he has located his clients, it is hereby stipulated that
he will produce them for their depositions at his office on
January 5, 1987, and if the plaintiffs fail to appear at that
time and place that the plaintiffs agree that the court will
dismiss their complaint filed herein.

-i-

DATED this

day of

, 1986.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

ROBERT G. GILCHRIST
Attorneys for Defendants
RICHARDS, CAINE AND RICHARDS

JOHN T. CAINE
Attorney for Plaintiffs

-2-ii-

ORDER
Based upon the foregoing stipulation of counsel,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that plaintiffs will appear at
their attorneys' office on January 5, 1987, at 10:00 a.m. for
their depositions, and if they fail to appear at that time that
upon notice to the court, that this matter will be dismissed.
DATED this

day of

, 1986.

BY THE COURT:

THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS J .

D i s t r i c t Court Judge

HEIDLEB2/RGG
JW12176
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CORNABY

GARY D. STOTT
ROBERT G. GILCHRIST
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
Attorneys for Defendants
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH and GRETTA
JOYCE HEIDLEBAUGH, husband
and wife,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
LEROY WEBB, PAUL NELSON and
CLINTON CITY,

Civil No.:

38432

Defendants.

Based upon the previously submitted stipulation of
counsel that the plaintiffs would appear for their depositions
at 10:00 a.m. on January 5, 1987, and the defendants' counsel
of record having submitted a notice of said depositions, and
it being represented to the court that the plaintiffs did not
appear at the above stated time and place, that based upon the
foregoing stipulation that this matter would be dismissed,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiffs' complaint
is hereby dismissed.
-iv—

DATED this

ML

day of

J—

1987.

BY THE COURT:
DOUGLAS L CORNABY
DISTRICT JUDGE

THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS J. CORNABY
District Court Judge
Approved* as to Form:

JOHN/CAINS
Attorney for Plaintiffs

hJjj-eJr

.T G. GILCHRIST
ney for Defendants
HEIDLEB3/RGG
JW157
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In the Second Judicial District Court
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in and for the

^

County of Davis, State of Utah
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH, et al.;
Plaintiffs,
vs.
LEROY WEBB, et al.,
Defendants.

BV

^flrTEi^

]
]
]I

RULING ON MOTION
TO DISMISS

]•

Civil No. 42977

]

The defendants' motion to dismiss came before the court for
oral argument on August 2, 1988, with Peter C. Collins appearing
for the plaintiffs and Robert G. Gilchrist appearing for the
defendants. After oral argument, the court took the motion under
advisement. The court now rules on the motion.
The motion to dismiss is granted.
The issue before this court is whether or not the prior
action is res judicatta.
On November 22, 1985, the same plaintiffs sued the same
defendants on identical allegations as contained herein. That
file was number 38432. In that action the defendants notified
the plaintiffs on June 17, 1986, that the deposition of Robert
Heidlebaugh would be taken on August 13, 1986.
This was
continued to September 9, 1986. The plaintiffs attorney could
not produce his client for a deposition. On November 4, 1986,
the defendants moved to compel the deposition or dismiss the
action. On December 16, 1986, counsel for all parties reached a
stipulation, to-wit, plaintiff, Robert Heidlebaugh would appear
for deposition on January 5, 1987, or the plaintiffs' action
would be dismissed. The deposition was not taken. On February

-vi-

10, 1987, the court signed the order of dismissal*
The order
does not specify that the dismissal is with prejudice or without
prejudice. Rule 41(b) provides:
"Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or
for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits."
This is so notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 41(a)(1). The
plaintiff's attorney stipulated to the dismissal only because he
could not produce his client for a deposition even though he had
from June, 1986, to January, 1987 to do so. The dismissal was
granted because the plaintiff would not make himself available
for a deposition. This was a dismissal for cause. It operated
as "an adjudication upon the merits."
Under the view stated above the plaintiffs are not entitled
to the benefits of Utah Code 78-12-40 which is the saving
statute.
The defendants are ordered to draw a formal order consistent
with this order.
Dated August 4, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Peter C. Collins, P. 0.
Box 2668, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 and Robert G.
Gilchrist, P. 0. Box 2465, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 on August
4, 1988.
y
y
Deputy Clerk
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tro ceo ^q
ROBERT G. GILCHRIST
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
Attorneys for Defendants
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
Post Office Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777

C M |9:

13

CL:.V..l .- 1 .'. :C-37
*„•
^
r ~ L - >.*\

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH, et al.,
ORDER
Plaintiffs,
-vLEROY WEBB, et al. ,

Civil No. 42977

Defendants.

The defendants' motion to dismiss having come on for
hearing before the court on August 2, 1988, with the plaintiffs
being represented by counsel of record Peter C. Collins, and
defendants being represented by counsel of record Robert G.
Gilchrist, and the court having heard argument, and having
reviewed the file
THAT IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that defendants1 motion i*
granted.

In reaching its ruling, the court finds the following

facts:

fltffcB
-Vlll-

1.

On November 22, 1985, the same plaintiffs herein

sued the same defendants herein on allegations virtually identical to those set forth in this action.
2.

In that action, Civil Number 38432, the defendants

submitted, on June 17, 1986, a notice of the deposition of
Robert Heidlebaugh to be taken on August 13, 1986.
3.

The deposition was subsequently continued by

notice to September 9, 1986.
4.

Neither plaintiff showed up.

5.

On November 4, 1986, the defendants moved the

court to compel the deposition or in the alternative to dismiss
the action.
6.

On December 16, 1986, counsel for the parties

reached a written stipulation, which required Robert Heidlebaugh
to appear for a deposition on January 5, 1987, or the plaintiffs1 action would be dismissed.
7.

The deposition of Robert Heidlebaugh was not held

on January 5, 1987.
8.

On February 10, 1987, the court signed an order

of dismissal, to which plaintiffs1 counsel in that action had
signed his approval.
The court concludes that the dismissal was granted
because the plaintiff Robert Heidlebaugh did not make himself
available for a deposition (the court makes no finding on the
question of whether he or plaintiff Joyce Heidlebaugh ever

-ix-2-

received notice of that or any of the other deposition dates),
and that, therefore, the Complaint was dismissed for cause. A
dismissal for cause is an adjudication upon the merits. An
adjudication upon the merits does not entitle the plaintiffs
to rely on U.C.A. §78-12-40, the saving statute, to file a
second action, even though such a second action, this action,
was filed in timely fashion pursuant to that statute.
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, the court hereby
orders, adjudges and decrees that the plaintiffs1 Complaint,
Amended Complaint, and Second Amended Complaint, are all hereby
dismissed with prejudice, with each party to bear its own costs
incurred herein.
DATED this

*C

day of

_..5Cv*V-

, 1988.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE DOOGLAS L.'CORNABY
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

I
^
Peter C. Collins
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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